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The liberalization of our immigration laws in the United States
appeared to be a priority on the political agenda while President
George W. Bush weighed proposals to expand access to visas,' until
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1. See Dan Eggen & Helen Dewar, Bush Weighing Plan for Mexican Guest Workers,
WASH. POST, July 25, 2001, at A3; Eric Schmitt, Bush Panel Backs Legalizing Status of Some
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terrorist attacks placed these plans on hold. 2 Democrats in Congress
urged even broader liberalization than that contemplated by the Bush
administration., Support from both labor unions and business
interests may make liberalizing reforms politically feasible in the near
future, 4 as the Bush administration has resumed negotiations with
Mexico on immigration policy with the support of Democrats in
Congress.5 This retreat from the overwhelmingly restrictionist politics
of recent years has been a welcome development, as considerations of
not only national economic welfare but also social justice militate in
favor of liberalized access for aliens seeking employment in the
United States.
After all, our immigration restrictions are a form of government
mandated employment discrimination against aliens. Our immigra-
tion statute prohibits the hiring of aliens not authorized to work in the
United States and imposes sanctions on employers violating this
prohibition.6 Aliens are authorized to work here, for the most part,
only if they have a "green card," that is, are legal immigrants, or are
temporary workers with nonimmigrant visas.7 Our immigration laws
not only impose quantitative restrictions on the number of these visas
issued but also impose requirements for access to those visas that no
native would have to meet in order to work in the United States. 8
Even if our laws did not include an explicit ban on the hiring of
unauthorized immigrants, the threat of enforcement of our immigra-
Migrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2001, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Bush Says Plan for Immigrants Could
Expand, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2001, at Al; Eric Schmitt, U.S.-Mexico Talks Produce Agreement
on Immigration Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2001, at A4.
2. See Alfredo Corchado, Immigration Talks Between U.S., Mexico on Hold, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 19, 2001, at 5A; Mike Doming, Mexico Border Issue on Hold, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 21, 2001, at 16; Greg Miller & Nick Anderson, Mood Swiftly Changes on Immigra-
tion Borders: Legislators and White House to Seek Tighter Restrictions, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18,
2001, at A12; James Sterngold, Legal Residency Hopes of Millions Dashed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7,
2001, § 1A, at 33.
3. See Jonathan Peterson, Democrats Up Ante to Reform Immigration; Split Families,
Worker Rights Addressed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2001, at Al; Eric Schmitt, Democrats Counter
Administration on Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2001, at A19; Cheryl W. Thompson,
Democrats to Offer Plan to Reform Immigration, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2001, at A2.
4. See Thomas B. Edsall & Cheryl W. Thompson, Alliance Forms on Immigrant Policies;
Business, Church, Labor Groups Unite on Liberalization, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2001, at Al.
5. See Mary Jordan & Kevin Sullivan, U.S. and Mexico to Resume Talks on Immigration
Policy; Issue Will Be Recast as One of National Security; Daschle, Gephardt to Meet With
President Fox, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at A40; Ginger Thompson, Top Democrats Politick
Through Rural Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at A12.
6. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2000).
7. See id. § 1324a(h)(3).
8. See id. §§ 1151-1153.
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tion laws, through the exclusion and deportation of aliens, would
prevent or curtail alien access to employment opportunities in our
labor markets. Thus, our immigration laws are a substantial barrier
to the free flow of alien labor into the United States.
For example, we require "labor certification" for most categories
of employment-based immigration visas, including those for skilled
workers, even workers holding advanced degrees. 9 Labor certifica-
tion requires, among other things, that the employer show that "there
are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified ... and
available" to perform the work in question. 0 By "qualified," our
immigration laws generally mean minimally qualified." Thus, our
laws mandate that employers choose any minimally qualified U.S.
worker over any better qualified alien. 2 Through our immigration
laws, we deny aliens access to valuable employment opportunities
that are open to natives. At a fundamental level, these laws are at
odds with antidiscrimination principles we take for granted in other
contexts. 13
This government mandated employment discrimination is espe-
cially striking given the basis for the discrimination. Most aliens are
born aliens because our nationality laws deem them to be aliens
based on immutable characteristics, including the geographic location
of their birth and the citizenship of their parents at the time of their
birth. 14 For a liberal society that declares that "all men are created
equal,"' 5 this discrimination, based explicitly on circumstances of
9. Id. §§ 1153(b)(2)-(3), 1182(a)(5)(D).
10. Id. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(i).
11. The statute requires the U.S. worker to be "equally qualified" only in the case of an
alien who "is a member of the teaching profession" or "has exceptional ability in the sciences or
the arts." Id. § 1182(a)(5)(A)(ii).
12. See STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 185 (2d
ed. 1997) ("[Tlhe employer ordinarily must hire a minimally qualified American over a more
qualified alien (or hire no one at all).").
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
14. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born... in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States .. "); 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2000)
(setting forth categories of "citizens of the United States at birth").
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). As the focus of this article
is an evaluation of U.S. immigration policies, my analysis examines the tension between these
policies and the ideals of equality and neutrality that we generally espouse in the United States
within our liberal political philosophy. I do not address the question of whether other societies
must also live by the same principles to which we are committed, as that issue is beyond the
scope of this article. See Joseph H. Carens, Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian
Perspective, in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL MIGRATION OF
PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 25, 36-40 (Brian Barry & Robert E. Goodin eds., 1992) [hereinafter
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birth, is at odds with ideal principles of social justice.16 Our liberal
ideals raise a presumption in favor of equal treatment and place the
burden on those who defend discrimination to come forward with a
justification for discriminatory laws.
The discrimination based on nativity in our nationality laws
would be less important if it were a simple matter for an alien to gain
permanent residence in the United States and then naturalize. Once
an alien immigrates and gains lawful permanent residence, the alien
becomes a U.S. worker with access to the U.S. labor market and
eventually access to U.S. citizenship.17 Our immigration laws, how-
ever, raise significant barriers to immigration and thereby deny the
vast majority of aliens access to the employment opportunities
provided to U.S. natives as a birthright. Insofar as these hurdles
prevent most aliens who desire such access from enjoying the oppor-
tunities open to U.S. natives, they discriminate against those who are
born aliens in favor of those natives. The more restrictive our immi-
gration and naturalization policies, the more significance they confer
on nationality at birth, and the more our laws discriminate based on
circumstances of birth.
In Part I of this Article, I examine our immigration restrictions in
light of our liberal ideals of equality. I argue that these ideals require
us to extend equal concern to all individuals and that this cosmopoli-
tan perspective makes it difficult to justify our immigration restric-
tions. This violation of the principle of equal concern represents one
sense in which immigration restrictions violate our liberal ideals.
In Part II, I assume a less demanding moral theory, which allows
us to give the interests of natives priority over the interests of aliens.
I argue that even from this parochial perspective, it is difficult to
justify the employment discrimination implied by our immigration
restrictions as ideal policies unless we count the satisfaction of
segregationist preferences as a justification. The role of intolerance
in explaining the adoption of immigration restrictions underscores the
second sense in which the employment discrimination implied by our
immigration policies violates our liberal ideals.
FREE MOVEMENT] (asking whether other countries are obliged to have the same immigration
policies as the United States).
16. See Howard F. Chang, Immigration Policy, Liberal Principles, and the Republican
Tradition, 85 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2112-15 (1997).
17. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2000) (providing for naturalization of permanent resident
aliens).
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In Part III, I explore the normative implications of my analysis
for the reform of our immigration policies. I conclude that it is
difficult for us to justify employment discrimination against aliens
from a liberal perspective, whether we adopt the cosmopolitan
perspective or a less egalitarian perspective that allows us to favor the
interests of natives over those of aliens. The interests of natives,
however, may justify some restrictions on alien access to public
benefits and to citizenship, which would suggest liberalized guest-
worker programs as a component of immigration reform. These
programs would not be ideal from the cosmopolitan liberal perspec-
tive, but then neither would our current immigration restrictions. I
argue that guest-worker programs would represent a non-ideal,
second-best improvement over the status quo from a cosmopolitan
perspective, given constraints that make more ideal policies politically
infeasible. Finally, in Part IV, I offer some concluding remarks.
I. THE LIBERAL IDEAL AND THE COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE
Consider the liberal theory of justice developed by John Rawls,
who asks what principles people would choose behind a "veil of
ignorance."S In this "original position," people know nothing about
their own personal circumstances or traits and thus "do not know how
the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they
are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general
considerations. '"19 This condition ensures that the parties are "fairly
situated and treated equally as moral persons,"20 or as Ronald
Dworkin describes, extends "equal concern and respect" to each
individual.21
Using Rawls' theory, Joseph Carens addresses the issue of immi-
gration restrictions as a question of social justice.22 In seeking a
justification for the exclusion of aliens, "we don't want to be biased
by self-interested or partisan considerations" and instead "can take it
as a basic presupposition that we should treat all human beings, not
just members of our own society, as free and equal moral persons."23
18. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136-42 (1971).
19. Id. at 136-37; see id. at 141 ("If a knowledge of particulars is allowed, then the outcome
is biased by arbitrary contingencies.").
20. Id. at 141.
21. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180-81 (1977).
22. See Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL.
251, 255 (1987).
23. Id. at 256.
2003]
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Carens identifies this premise as a basic feature of all liberal political
theories, " concluding that we should "take a global, not a national,
view of the original position. '25
If we begin with equal concern for all persons, then immigration
barriers are morally suspect and demand justification. All immigra-
tion restrictions discriminate against individuals based on their
alienage, which in turn derives from immutable characteristics such as
birthplace (that is, national origin) and other circumstances of birth
such as parentage.26 National origin would appear to be a trait that
Rawls should deem "arbitrary from a moral point of view. ' '27 Carens
concludes that we cannot justify restrictions "on the grounds that
those born in a given territory or born of parents who were citizens
were more entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born
elsewhere or of alien parents. ' 28  Nor can we justify restrictions "on
the grounds that immigration would reduce the economic well-being
of current citizens. ' 29 Similarly, in a utilitarian calculation of global
welfare, "current citizens would enjoy no privileged position."30
A. Immigration Restrictions and Global Economic Welfare
Suppose we adopt the perspective of a global utilitarian and thus
give equal weight to the welfare of each individual in the world. Can
we then justify the employment discrimination mandated by our
immigration laws? Perhaps this unequal treatment for aliens is
somehow consistent with equal concern for the interests of each
individual.1 An economic analysis of the welfare effects of immigra-
24. See id. at 265 (claiming that "our social institutions and public policies must respect all
human beings as moral persons," which "entails recognition.., of the freedom and equality of
every human being"); see also id. at 269 ("No moral argument will seem acceptable... if it
directly challenges the assumption of the equal moral worth of all individuals.").
25. Id. at 256.
26. See Roger Nett, The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of
People on the Face of the Earth, 81 ETHICS 212, 224 (1971) ("May we expect the lesson which
the Negro has taught his fellow Americans about denial of fair opportunities to be repeated on a
broader scale, with the underprivileged of the earth demanding 'desegregation' of nation
states?").
27. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 72.
28. Carens, supra note 22, at 261.
29. Id. at 262.
30. Id. at 263 ("[T]he utilitarian commitment to moral equality is reflected in the
assumption that everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one when utility is
calculated.").
31. As Dworkin explains, "the right to treatment as an equal" does not necessarily imply a
"right to equal treatment" in the allocation of a particular opportunity. DWORKIN, supra note
21, at 227.
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tion restrictions, however, indicates that these barriers to labor
migration not only reduce global wealth but also increase inequality
in its distribution worldwide. These barriers are neither economically
efficient nor equitable.
Consider the economic effects of labor migration in world labor
markets. We would expect labor to migrate from low-wage countries
to high-wage countries in pursuit of higher wages. As a result of this
migration, world output rises. Higher wages in the host country imply
that the marginal product of labor is higher there than in the source
country. That is, higher wages for the same worker mean that the
worker produces more value in the host country than in the source
country. Labor migration generally leads to net gains in wealth for
the world as a whole, because labor flows to the country where it has
the higher value use.32 An efficient global labor market would allow
labor to move freely to the country where it earns the highest return.
Market forces would thus direct labor to the market where its mar-
ginal product is highest. For this reason, economic theory raises a
presumption in favor of the free movement of labor.
Immigration barriers interfere with the free flow of labor inter-
nationally and thereby cause wage rates for the same class of labor to
diverge widely among different countries. 33 For any given class of
labor, residents of high-wage countries could gain by employing more
immigrant labor, and residents of low-wage countries could gain by
selling more of their labor to employers in high-wage countries.
Immigration restrictions distort the global labor market, producing a
misallocation of labor among countries, thereby wasting human
resources and creating unnecessary poverty in labor-abundant
countries.
The larger the inequality in wages between countries, the larger
the distortion of global labor markets caused by migration restric-
tions, and the larger the economic gains from liberalizing labor
migration. Given the large international differences in wages, it
should be apparent that the potential gains from liberalized labor
migration (and the costs that the world bears as a result of immigra-
tion barriers) are huge. In fact, some economists have attempted to
32. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS:
THEORY AND POLICY 158-59 (2d ed. 1991).
33. See Mexican Deportees Report Good Treatment, UPI, April 21, 1996, available at
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File (reporting that Mexican immigrants received an average of
$278 per week in the United States, compared with $30.81 per week in Mexico).
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estimate the gains that the world could enjoy by liberalizing migra-
tion. These studies suggest that the gains to the world economy from
removing immigration barriers could well be enormous and greatly
exceed the gains from removing trade barriers. For example, Bob
Hamilton and John Whalley provide a range of estimates based on
various assumptions about critical parameters, but all of their esti-
mates suggest that the potential gains are large.34 Many of their
estimates suggest that the gains from free migration of labor would
more than double worldwide real income.35 Even their most conserva-
tive estimate suggests that the gains would be a significant fraction
(more than 13 percent) of worldwide real income.36 Furthermore,
their analysis indicates that the free migration of labor would also
greatly improve the global distribution of income by raising real
wages dramatically for the world's poorest workers.37
Given these welfare effects, the employment discrimination im-
plied by immigration restrictions are difficult to defend in terms of
the cosmopolitan liberal ideal. This ideal would extend the principle
of equal concern expressed by Rawls' original position to all persons.
Carens and others conclude from these liberal premises that "we have
an obligation to open our borders much more fully than we do now. 38
B. Justice and the Alien
Some theorists have questioned the application of Rawls' origi-
nal position to the international context. Rawls himself assumes that
the "boundaries" of his principles "are given by the notion of a self-
contained national community."3 9 James Woodward argues in favor
of applying Rawls' framework to inhabitants of a particular country
rather than globally.40 Similarly, Stephen Perry notes that the scope
of the original position is limited to persons within a single society,
34. See Bob Hamilton & John Whalley, Efficiency and Distributional Implications of
Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility, 14 J. DEV. ECON. 61 (1984).
35. See id. at 70.
36. See id. at 71-72.
37. See id. at 73-74.
38. Carens, supra note 22, at 270. Carens condemns immigration restrictions: "Like feudal
barriers to mobility, they protect unjust privilege." Id. Similarly, Bruce Ackerman concludes
that immigration barriers are inconsistent with liberal principles: "I cannot justify my power to
exclude you without destroying my own claim to membership in an ideal liberal state." BRUCE
A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 93 (1980).
39. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 457.
40. James Woodward, Commentary: Liberalism and Migration, in FREE MOVEMENT, supra
note 15, at 59. 75; see id. at 75-81.
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which Rawls defines as "'a cooperative venture for mutual advan-
tage."'' 4' Citing Rawls' definition, Perry argues that "[t]he original
position is not appropriately employed [to create a situation in which]
the parties all live in different countries or societies and do not know
which one is theirs." 42
The first problem with Perry's argument is that it raises the ques-
tion of whether a world in which countries engage in international
trade in goods, services, capital, and labor is a "cooperative venture
for mutual advantage. ' 43 If so, then the world is a "society" in which
all individuals would be parties to the original position.44 Under this
theory, by choosing to cooperate, we take on obligations of justice
toward one another.
There is, however, a deeper problem inherent in making obliga-
tions of justice contingent on voluntary acts of cooperation. This
approach allows us to avoid obligations of justice by refusing to
cooperate with disfavored groups. If we impose a boycott or embargo
against aliens, then we owe them no explanation in terms of justice.
This approach reconciles discrimination against aliens with egalitarian
principles of social justice only by fiat: it assumes the result rather
than deriving it.4
We cannot begin our normative analysis by assuming that we do
not cooperate with aliens. As the example of immigration policy
demonstrates, the question of which individuals we choose as partners
in cooperation is itself an open question of public policy that we may
want to answer using our principles of justice. If we make obligations
of justice contingent on whether we cooperate in the first place, then
this normative framework becomes a function of our policies and
cannot work as an independent standard that we can use to evaluate
these policies. Our analysis becomes circular: we are justified in
discriminating against aliens in employment precisely because our
41. Stephen R. Perry, Immigration, Justice, and Culture, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION 94,
107 (Warren F. Schwartz ed., 1995) (quoting RAWLS, supra note 18, at 4).
42. Id.
43. See CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 143-53
(1979) (arguing that sufficient cooperation and interaction exists among nations to justify a
global view of the original position).
44. See Thomas M. Scanlon, Jr., Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1020, 1066-67
(1973) (arguing that "considerations of justice apply at least wherever there is systematic
economic interaction" and therefore Rawls' principles of justice "apply to the world economic
system taken as a whole").
45. Thus, critics of this approach complain that it is "an arbitrary move which cannot be
defended within the theory." BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 129 (1973).
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refusal to hire them relieves us of obligations of justice. Such a theory
begs the question of whether our choice of partners is itself justifi-
able.46
Only the global interpretation of the original position offers a
satisfactory framework for the evaluation of our immigration policies
under a liberal egalitarian theory of justice. This cosmopolitan
perspective is the only interpretation of the original position that is
faithful to "the underlying spirit of Rawls' theory," which "is ani-
mated by the underlying idea of eliminating or compensating for
'morally arbitrary' differences between people. ' 47  Cosmopolitan
liberals note that "the fact that one is an inhabitant of one particular
country rather than another.., is a paradigmatic example of the sort
of 'morally arbitrary' fact that the method of the original position is
designed to abstract from." 48 To restrict the scope of our theory of
justice based on such morally arbitrary facts undermines our claim to
a liberal egalitarian theory of justice.
Nevertheless, Woodward seeks to justify this restriction on the
original position by pointing to "real world facts about people's actual
motivation and non-ideal behaviour. '49 He notes that "very extensive
immigration rights... are not rights that people in affluent countries
would be motivated to act in accordance with or to respect, once they
take up their places in such societies" and concludes that
"[r]ecognizing this, the parties to a global contract would not agree to
such rights."50 These political realities, Woodward argues, constrain
the theory of justice that emerges from the original position.
Woodward's appeal to realism, however, confuses the ideal and
non-ideal parts of a theory of justice. Rawls explains that his "main
concern" is with the ideal theory, which "assumes strict compliance"
and describes "a perfectly just basic structure" under "favorable
circumstances."'" "Existing institutions are to be judged in light of
46. Thus, the fact that cooperation is feasible should be sufficient to require the inclusion
of a prospective party to the original position. See Charles Beitz, Cosmopolitan Ideals and
National Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591, 595 (1983) (arguing that otherwise, "limiting the scope of
the principles to national societies on the grounds that international cooperation does not exist
today.., would arbitrarily favor the status quo").
47. Woodward, supra note 40, at 80-81. In this sense, Rawls' failure to extend his
principles globally is "an ad hoc move ... inconsistent with the underlying egalitarian spirit" of
his theory. Id. at 76.
48. Id. at 76.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 245.
[Vol 78:291
IMMIGRA TION AND THE WORKPLACE
this conception and held to be unjust to the extent that they depart
from it without sufficient reason. '52 The non-ideal theory "is worked
out after an ideal conception of justice has been chosen; only then do
the parties ask which principles to adopt under less happy condi-
tions.' '1 3 The non-ideal theory takes account of "historical contingen-
cies" and "injustice" in existing social arrangements. 5 4 Thus, if we
understand our project as the formulation of an ideal theory, then the
popularity of policies deemed unjust under that theory is no reason to
revise our theory to uphold those policies instead.
If we apply Woodward's approach to our ideal theory of justice,
then we make the theory vulnerable to capture by popular prejudice
and undermine its capacity for a critical evaluation of the status quo.
By taking actual non-ideal behavior as given, Woodward imparts a
conservative bias to the original position. Carrying this approach to
its logical conclusion, we would conclude that the parties to the
original position could only endorse existing arrangements. Such an
ideal theory would fail to serve its function, which is to provide a
standard by which to judge existing institutions.
Carens suggests that a "realistic" approach to morality in
seventeenth-or eighteenth-century America "would perhaps have led
one to articulate a morality for slaveholders, rather than calling into
question the institution of slavery and demanding its abolition."55 He
notes that "any moral view of slavery was flawed and inadequate if it
did not start from the recognition that slavery was fundamentally evil
and unjust" and that "[a]ny satisfactory moral view had to have
abolition as its ultimate goal. 56 A realist account would be flawed
and unsatisfactory in two possible senses. First, Carens may mean
that it would simply fail to describe moral truth and therefore would
be a false moral theory. Second, a realist account might be inade-
quate because it would fail to advance the cause of justice over the
long term. That is, by legitimating the status quo, the realist would
fail to promote more enlightened attitudes and thus would stall
progress toward more just policies.57 In contrast, "[a]pproaching
52. Id. at 246.
53. Id. at 245-46.
54. Id. at 246.
55. Joseph H. Carens, Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration, 30
INT'L MIGRATION REV. 156, 164 (1996).
56. Id. at 165.
57. In the immigration context, for example, Louis Michael Seidman urges us to "avoid
further strengthening the hand of those who would defend exclusion and bounded caring."
20031
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moral questions from an idealistic perspective avoids legitimating
policies and practices that are morally wrong and gives the fullest
scope to our critical capacities."58
If we allow the realist perspective to displace our ideals, then we
breed complacency regarding the morality of the status quo. Robert
Goodin suggests that morality may sometimes require us to advocate
"unrealistic" options:
[I]f the only reason the options are unrealistic is that people are
unwilling to make sacrifices that they could and arguably should in
pursuit of morally important goals, then those options should be
very much on the table. The proper role of politics, in such circum-
stances, is precisely not to 'be realistic' and accept uncritically peo-
ple's unwillingness to make morally proper sacrifices. It is, rather,
to persuade them that moral ideals are worth pursuing. 59
In this sense, according to Carens, "ideal theory holds up the princi-
ple of free migration as an essential part of the just social order
toward which we should strive."6°
Woodward objects that "as we abstract away from real world
facts.., the relevance of the (ideal) principles and institutions that
would emerge from such an idealized original position to what we
should do in the actual non-ideal world.., becomes progressively less
clear. ' 61 He asks what this ideal theory implies "about how nations
should behave in the actual world, which is very far from conforming
to these ideal arrangements? '62 Woodward is right to ask what
practical implications this ideal theory has for our non-ideal world
even if he is wrong to suggest that we should reject an ideal theory
because it is unrealistic. What good are the prescriptions of ideal
theory if there is no real chance that we would actually adopt the
prescribed policies? With Woodward's question in mind, let us next
turn to the perspective that he might consider more relevant from a
realist perspective.
Louis Michael Seidman, Fear and Loathing at the Border, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION. supra
note 41, at 140; see id. at 141 (criticizing arguments that "provide ammunition for defenders of
exclusion and apologists for the status quo.").
58. Carens, supra note 55, at 167.
59. Robert E. Goodin, Commentary: The Political Realism of Free Movement, in FREE
MOVEMENT, supra note 15, at 248, 254.
60. Carens, supra note 22, at 262.
61. Woodward, supra note 40, at 77.
62. Id.
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II. IMMIGRATION RESTRICTIONS AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC
WELFARE
Our immigration laws are usually justified based on an assump-
tion that we may privilege individuals born into those favored classes
entitled to U.S. citizenship upon birth under our nationality laws.63
Thus, the discrimination explicit in our laws derives from an implicit
assumption regarding the unequal status of persons based on nativity.
This assumption is one sense in which our immigration and national-
ity laws violate our ideals of equal concern for all persons.
There is also a second sense, however, in which these laws violate
our liberal ideals. To illustrate this point, consider the following
thought experiment. For the sake of argument, suppose we grant the
premise that we are entitled to favor the interests of natives over
those we designate as aliens based on circumstances of birth. I adopt
this nativist perspective strictly as a theoretical exercise, not because I
believe that our immigration policies should be guided solely by the
interests of natives, but because such concerns have in fact played a
dominant role in the public debate over immigration policy and are
commonly thought to provide the strongest case in favor of restrictive
immigration laws.
We might adopt this nativist perspective as a concession to politi-
cal realities.64 National governments, including that of the United
States, will likely continue to deem the promotion of the interests of
natives as the paramount objective of immigration policies. It may be
politically infeasible to ask natives to set aside their collective self-
interest in formulating our immigration laws. This non-ideal feature
of the real world may impose a constraint on the set of policy alterna-
tives open to us as a practical matter.
Furthermore, many observers believe that the pursuit of national
self-interest is justified as a moral matter. "Realists find it morally
acceptable that we should prefer the interests of our own collective to
63. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 98-62, at 3 (1983) ("[Tjhe paramount obligation of any nation's
government, indeed the very reason for its existence and the justification for its power, is to
promote the national interest-the long-term welfare of the majority of its citizens and their
descendants.").
64. As Seidman observes, the limitations imposed by "bounded caring [are] like it or
not,... facts that exist in the world" and "unlikely to change more than marginally in the near
future," so that any "real-world immigration policy must.., take account of these facts and
work around them." Seidman, supra note 57, at 140.
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those of mankind in general... ,"65 From this standpoint, an analysis
of the effects of immigration restrictions on the interests of natives is
directly relevant to the determination of the ideal immigration policy.
This perspective need not ignore the interests of aliens entirely, but
may justify some discrimination against aliens by giving priority to
natives. Perry, for example, argues that "[t]here is ... an upper limit
on the self-sacrifice that liberal states can demand of their citizens,
and.., this limit will apply to the treatment of outsiders. '66 Specifi-
cally, he suggests that "[sitates may demand that.., immigrants not
be a burden on society, and even that they be capable of making a
positive contribution." 67
Can we justify our immigration restrictions using this criterion?
In particular, does the exclusion of aliens mandated by our immigra-
tion laws actually promote the economic interests of natives, as
restrictionists claim? Does the promotion of the economic welfare of
natives call for these immigration restrictions? The following analysis
suggests that the answer to these questions, as they are normally
understood, is no. We would deem our immigration restrictions to be
ideal public policies from the perspective of natives only if we are
prepared to count the satisfaction of segregationist preferences as
elements of social welfare. It is in this sense that immigration restric-
tions violate our liberal ideals even if we assume arguendo that
national welfare is appropriate as our policy objective.
A. Effects of Immigration in the Labor Market
If we examine the impact of immigrants in the labor market, we
find that the natives of the host country, taken together, will gain
65. David C. Hendrickson, Migration in Law and Ethics: A Realist Perspective, in FREE
MOVEMENT, supra note 15, at 213, 214-15; see id. at 223 ("[Tjhe collective well-being of our
own state, and of the individuals who compose it, ought to have a greater weight in our moral
accounting than the well-being of those outside the community.").
66. Perry, supra note 41, at 105.
67. Id. at 109. Thus, Perry does not suggest that we seek to maximize the benefits derived
by natives from immigrants. Natives could extract the maximum benefit from immigrants by
imposing a tariff on them and thereby raising extra tax revenue from immigrants. See Howard
F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare and the Optimal Immigra-
tion Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1157-85 (1997) (analyzing the optimal tariff on immi-
grants, assuming that natives seek to maximize their own economic welfare). The criterion
Perry suggests would not go so far as to demand the maximum contribution from an immigrant;
he only asks that the contribution be positive.
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from the immigration of labor.6 Wages may fall for native workers
who compete with immigrant labor, but this loss for workers is a pure
transfer among natives: it is offset by an equal gain for those who
employ labor, and ultimately for consumers, who obtain goods and
services at lower cost.69 Furthermore, natives gain from employing
immigrant workers: they gain surplus in excess of what they pay
immigrants for their labor.7 0 If they did not gain any surplus from
employing immigrants, they would not hire them. Thus, natives as a
group enjoy a net gain.71 Labor migration represents a form of
international trade in which the source country exports labor to the
host country.72  Like international trade in goods, labor migration
allows foreign suppliers to sell their services to domestic buyers,
allowing both parties to enjoy gains from trade as a result of the
transaction.
1. Effects on Native Workers: Empirical Evidence
We may be concerned, of course, with the distribution of income
among natives. Immigration not only expands wealth, but also can
have important distributive effects. Those natives who must compete
with immigrants in the labor market may find that immigration
reduces their real income.73 Thus, countries often restrict immigration
to protect native workers from the unemployment or the wage
reductions that the entry of foreign workers would supposedly entail.
Studies of the effects of immigration in U.S. labor markets, how-
ever, have shown little evidence of effects on native wages or em-
68. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC,
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 135-53 (James P. Smith & Barry
Edmonston eds., 1997) [hereinafter NRC].
69. See id. at 138-39.
70. See id.
71. George Borjas has attempted a rough calculation of the size of the surplus enjoyed by
natives in the United States as a result of immigration using a variety of assumptions. See
George J. Borjas, The Economic Benefits from Immigration, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 3,
5. Assuming a homogeneous supply of labor, for example, Borjas estimates that immigration
into the United States has produced a surplus of $7 billion per year. See id. at 7. Borjas
describes this amount as "relatively small" compared to the size of the U.S. economy. Id. As
the NRC notes, however, this benefit "remains a significant positive gain in absolute terms" and
remains large compared to the economic effects of most other public policies: "Not many
changes in policies would produce benefits as large as that number." NRC, supra note 68, at
153. Furthermore, if these benefits seem too small, then we can enjoy larger gains by taking in
more immigrants and thereby increasing the immigration surplus.
72. See Howard F. Chang, Migration as International Trade: The Economic Gains from the
Liberalized Movement of Labor, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 371 (1998-99).
73. See NRC, supra note 68, at 138-40.
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ployment. 74  A survey of this empirical literature indicates that
immigration has a weak effect on the employment of natives. 75
Furthermore, the evidence indicates a weak relationship between
native wages and immigration across all types of native workers,
white or black, skilled or unskilled. 76
Why do immigrants have so little adverse impact on the wages
and employment of natives? One reason is that the demand for labor
does not remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. Immi-
grant workers not only supply labor, for example, they also demand
goods and services, and this demand will translate into greater
demand for locally supplied labor. This increase in demand can offset
the effect of increased supply.
Furthermore, the empirical evidence indicates that immigrants
and natives are not perfect substitutes in the labor market. 77 Thus,
immigrants often do not compete for the same jobs as natives.
Indeed, immigrant labor can be a complement rather than a substi-
tute for native labor, so that an increase in the supply of immigrant
labor will increase the demand for native labor and thus have positive
effects on native workers rather than negative effects. In fact, labor
markets are highly segregated, with immigrant labor concentrated in
some occupations while natives are concentrated in others.7
If only immigrant workers take certain jobs, then natives can
gain from immigration in these markets without any adverse effect on
the wages of native workers. Moreover, if native workers can move
into jobs where their competitive advantage (in English language
skills, for example) provides a natural barrier to competition from
immigrants, then they can enjoy the benefits of immigration and still
avoid any adverse effects of immigration in the labor market. Thus,
segmented labor markets imply that immigration can produce gains
for natives in the labor market without necessarily producing adverse
effects for native workers.
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., George J. Borjas, The Economics of Immigration, 32 J. ECON. LIT. 1667, 1698
(1994); Rachel M. Friedberg & Jennifer Hunt, The Impact of Immigrants on Host Country
Wages, Employment and Growth, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 23, 42; NRC, supra note 68,
at 223.
76. See, e.g., George J. Borjas, supra note 75, at 1697; Friedberg & Hunt, supra note 75, at
42; NRC, supra note 68, at 223.
77. See Jean Baldwin Grossman, The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants in
Production, 64 REV. ECON. & STAT. 596 (1982).
78. See NRC, supra note 68, at 218.
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It is important to interpret claims in the literature in light of the
empirical evidence of segmented labor markets. For example,
George Borjas, Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz produce one of
the largest estimates of the effect of immigrants on native wages.7 9
They estimate that immigration between 1980 and 1995 accounted for
44 percent of the 11 percent decline in the relative wages of high
school dropouts in the United States during this period.80 Those who
advocate restrictive immigration policies have seized upon this study
to support their claims of adverse effects on unskilled native workers,
and its conclusions have therefore been widely cited by restrictionists
in current debates over immigration reform. 1 Yet at most, the study
suggests that immigration restrictions benefit the shrinking minority
of native workers with less than a high school education.82
More important, this study uses a questionable methodology.
Borjas, Freeman, and Katz derive their estimates from a simulation
that assumes that unskilled immigrants are perfect substitutes for
unskilled natives.83 That is, this simulation makes an extreme assump-
tion regarding the single most important fact in dispute. Therefore,
simulations based on this assumption are biased in favor of finding
large effects on natives, and thus at best provide only an upper bound
on the potential effect of immigration on the wages of unskilled
natives.A4
79. See George J. Borjas et al., How Much Do Immigration and Trade Affect Labor Market
Outcomes?, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY, No. 1, at 1 (William C. Bradland &
George C. Perry eds.,1997).
80. See id. at 53, 62.
81. The restrictionist Center for Immigration Studies ("CIS"), for example, cites this study
in its own paper criticizing immigration from Mexico. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA,
IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO: ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES 22 (2001)
(citing the estimates by Borjas, Freeman, and Katz to support his conclusion that "immigration
had a significant adverse impact on the wages of natives without a high school education"). In
turn, the media widely reported the conclusions of this CIS paper. See, e.g., Joe Cantlupe,
Guest-worker Program Called Misguided, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 13, 2001, at A16;
Alfredo Corchado, Studies Conflict on Benefits, Costs of Mexican Influx: Both Sides Presss Issue
Before Fox, Congress Debates, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 13, 2001, at 10A; Jerry Kammer,
Mexican Immigrants Sap Citizens, Report Says, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 13, 2001, at A8; Patrick J.
McDonnell, Dim View of Mexico Migration; Study: Group Backing Tight Limits Says Influx
Brings Huge Costs But Few Benefits, L.A. TIMES, July 13, 2001, pt. 2, at 1.
82. See NRC, supra note 68, at 228 (noting that "[b]y 1995, high school dropouts repre-
sented less than 10 percent of the American workforce" and were "a declining group of
American workers").
83. See Borjas et al., supra note 79, at 56. Thus, this approach "does not truly estimate the
actual impact of immigration on the labor market." NRC, supra note 68, at 227.
84. See Friedberg & Hunt, supra note 75, at 39.
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Furthermore, Borjas, Freeman, and Katz simulate what would
have happened if we had cut off all immigration and all increases in
trade flows since 1980.85 We cannot infer from their study that
immigration restrictions alone could have prevented the drop in
wages that they identify, because they do not attempt to simulate that
counterfactual. Given that immigration and international trade are
substitutes, a decrease in immigration would probably cause an
increase in trade flows, which would have a similarly depressing effect
on the wages of unskilled natives. This trade effect is a second reason
that their results overstate the actual effect that immigration policies
standing alone would have upon native wages.
2. Income Distribution and the Costs of Protectionism
Even if present levels of immigration have little effect on native
wages in the United States, a more liberal immigration policy might
produce more significant effects. Indeed, much of the support for
current immigration restrictions is protectionist in nature. Restric-
tionists often cite the need to protect U.S. workers from immigrant
competition in the labor market.86
Like trade barriers, however, immigration barriers sacrifice gains
from trade and thus reduce the total wealth of natives as a group.87 In
this sense, protectionism is a costly way to redistribute wealth from
some natives to others. It is likely that we could redistribute this
same wealth through tax policies and transfer programs rather than
through protectionism and thereby make all classes of natives better
off, because liberalized immigration produces net gains for natives as
a group. Thus, concern for the distribution of income among natives
does not imply that restrictive immigration laws are in order.
First, concerns regarding income inequality do not justify any re-
strictions on skilled immigration, because skilled immigrants not only
increase total wealth for natives but also promote a more equitable
distribution of income among natives. They are likely to have an
adverse effect only on competing skilled natives and increase the real
wages of everyone else, including less skilled natives, who enjoy the
benefits of a greater supply of skilled labor. Therefore, the pursuit of
a more equal distribution of income would at most justify concerns
85. See Borjas et al., supra note 79, at 61.
86. See, e.g., George J. Borjas, HEAVENS DOOR: IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY (1999).
87. See NRC, supra note 68, at 135-53.
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regarding unskilled immigration, which could have an adverse effect
on real wages of unskilled native workers.
Second, even with respect to unskilled immigration, the appro-
priate response to these distributive concerns is redistribution
through progressive reforms of tax and transfer policies, not immigra-
tion restrictions. If we wish to protect unskilled native workers from
adverse distributive effects, redistribution is likely to be a less costly
solution than protectionism. If so, then optimal policies would
liberalize immigration insofar as it increases the total wealth of
natives. As long as immigration increases total wealth, then those
who gain from immigration can compensate those who lose and still
be better off. That is, those who gain by paying lower wages, or by
buying products and services at lower cost, can afford to pay enough
to compensate those who find their wages fall relative to prices.
Through redistribution, we can attempt to shift the costs of liberalized
immigration to the beneficiaries of liberalization.
This redistribution would produce some costly distortions, but
the deadweight loss of protectionism would presumably be greater
than the deadweight loss from taxes with the same effect on the
overall distribution of income. That is, protectionism is presump-
tively less efficient than the tax system in producing a desirable
distribution of income, because protectionism not only produces the
distortions associated with redistribution, but also sacrifices the gains
from immigration in the labor market.88 For example, if the immigra-
88. Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell suggest that we can always replace an economically
inefficient rule with an efficient rule without making any income class worse off provided that
we make the appropriate adjustments in income taxes. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell,
Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994); Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in
Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 414 (1981). They argue that "using legal rules to redistrib-
ute income distorts work incentives fully as much as the income tax system-because the
distortion is caused by the redistribution itself-and also creates inefficiencies in the activities
regulated by the legal rules." Kaplow & Shavell, supra, at 667-68. Critics have objected to this
"double-distortion argument" by pointing out that legal rules are not always less costly than
income taxes. See, e.g., Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale,
86 CORNELL L. REV. 1003, 1008 (2001). It seems fair to conclude, however, that the double-
distortion argument still raises a presumption in favor of taxes rather than inefficient legal rules,
subject to a possible rebuttal in any particular case along the lines suggested by these critics.
The objections raised by these critics do not imply that protectionism is superior to redistri-
bution through taxes. Chris Sanchirico, for example, notes that a double distortion may be less
costly than a single distortion, because "[d]istortions may counteract one another." Id. at 1017.
There seems to be no reason to think, however, that the distortions associated with protection-
ism mitigate the distortions in work incentives associated with redistribution. Similarly,
Christine Jolls suggests that legal rules may achieve redistribution with less distortion in work
incentives if individual workers bear the cost imposed by the legal rule with only low probability
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tion of unskilled workers reduces the wages of unskilled natives, then
raising taxes on those workers with higher incomes and reducing
taxes on native workers with the lowest incomes could leave all
classes of natives better off than they would be in the absence of
immigration. 89 That is, those classes that would pay higher taxes to
compensate unskilled native workers are likely to bear a still heavier
burden under the protectionist alternative, which raises the prices of
goods and services for all consumers. That is, protectionist policies
currently impose an implicit tax on these consumers that probably
costs them more than the explicit tax that would be necessary to
compensate unskilled native workers for the effects of liberalized
immigration policies. Once we recognize that protectionism is merely
a disguised tax-and-transfer program, it should be apparent that there
is no good reason to favor protectionism over less costly and more
efficient transfer policies.
We could achieve redistribution more efficiently and equitably
by expanding programs already in use under the existing U.S. tax
system. We could make Social Security taxes more progressive, for
example, or we could increase the earned income tax credit and
liberalize its eligibility requirements. 9 These progressive reforms can
and are unduly optimistic. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive
Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653 (1998). Insofar as protectionism ultimately transfers
wealth through the same channel as the income tax, by changing the worker's after-tax income,
Jolls' critique offers no defense for protectionism. Jolls also suggests that if workers treat the
cost of a legal rule as an expenditure out of income "rather than direct charges against income,"
this mental accounting may reduce distortions in work incentives. Id. at 1670. Insofar as this
claim is true about the costs of protectionism, however, at most it would militate in favor of
taxes on luxury goods as our redistributive policy, not in favor of protectionist policies that
needlessly sacrifice gains from immigration in the labor market.
Finally, Sanchirico also suggests that individuals may be heterogeneous in ways that make
legal rules superior to taxes. Sanchirico, supra, at 1057-64; see Chris William Sanchirico, Taxes
Versus Legal Rules as Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797
(2000). This objection might suggest a defense of immigration restrictions if such policies
happened to change the incomes, for example, of those with the least elastic supply of labor.
There is no reason, however, to think that protectionism targets its transfers in ways that reduce
distortions in work incentives. Nor is there any reason to believe that protectionism targets its
transfers in ways especially appealing from the perspective of equity. See infra note 91.
89. See Barry R. Chiswick, Illegal Immigration and Immigration Control, J. ECON. PERSP.,
Summer 1988, at 101, 107.
90. Thus, I do not propose that we identify workers displaced by immigrant competition
and target subsidies to those individuals as we direct "adjustment assistance" to those harmed
by import competition. See RAJ BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 1580-89 (2d ed. 2000)
(discussing trade adjustment assistance programs); JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 660-65 (3d ed. 1995) (same). Trade
adjustment programs have proven "nightmarishly complex" and "ineffectual." BHALA, supra,
at 1582. Instead, the measures proposed here would only seek to ensure that immigration
liberalization does not increase after-tax income inequality.
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supplement the income of unskilled native workers if unskilled
immigration drives down their real wages. This alternative could
reduce deadweight loss while still redistributing the same amount of
wealth that we currently redistribute through costly protectionism.
Evidence that immigration has only mild effects upon the wages of
unskilled natives suggests that modest changes in the tax system may
be sufficient to offset the distributive effects of liberalized U.S.
immigration policies.
These measures would not seek to compensate precisely every
single individual affected adversely by liberalization so that immigra-
tion reform would make literally no one worse off. To insist that
these reforms effect a Pareto improvement over the status quo is to
set too high a hurdle for reform. Such a requirement would prevent
us from implementing virtually any reform in any public policy.
Not only is it infeasible as a practical matter to replicate exactly
the redistribution produced by protectionism, it is also not desirable
as a normative matter that we do so. We can design progressive tax
and transfer policies so that they redistribute income on the basis of
morally relevant criteria, whereas the alternative of protectionism
distributes its subsidy on a morally arbitrary basis. Protectionism
subsidizes the unskilled native who happens to face immigrant
competition in the labor market but not the similarly unskilled native
who does not. In this sense, protectionism is inferior to tax and
transfer policies from the perspective of not only economic efficiency
but also horizontal equity.9t
B. Fiscal Effects of Immigration
The presence of transfer policies, however, may raise concerns
about the effect of immigrants upon the public treasury. Much of the
debate over the effects of immigration upon the welfare of natives has
focused on the possibility of negative fiscal effects.92 Even if concerns
about the fiscal costs of immigration were to justify restrictions on
unskilled immigration, however, these concerns would not justify any
restrictions on the immigration of skilled workers, who tend to have
higher incomes and pay more in taxes than they cost in terms of
public benefits. The empirical evidence confirms that educated
91. Thus, protectionism derives no justification from the fact that the transfers that it
achieves do not fall on precisely the same individuals as redistributive transfers through the tax
system. See supra note 88.
92. See, e.g., CAMAROTA, supra note 81, at 35-41, 53-54; NRC, supra note 68, at 254-362.
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immigrants will on average have a net positive effect on natives,
taking into account their effects on the public treasury.93 It would be
in the economic interests of U.S. natives to admit skilled workers
without protectionist "labor certification" requirements or quantita-
tive restrictions. The United States should eliminate or liberalize
these restrictions.
1. Fiscal Policies as Less Restrictive Alternatives to Exclusion
Even for unskilled immigrants, the optimal response to fiscal
concerns would not be exclusion, but less restrictive alternatives
designed to eliminate the fiscal burden that these immigrants impose
on natives. That is, if some immigrants have a negative effect on the
public sector, the optimal response is not quantitative or other
protectionist restrictions on immigration. Rather, the appropriate
response is fiscal. Restrictions on alien access to public benefits, for
example, can improve the fiscal impact of immigration without
excluding unskilled immigrants from the U.S. labor force. Exclusion
is the more costly response for both natives and immigrants, because
it excludes immigrants not only from our public benefits but also from
our labor market and thereby sacrifices the gains from trade that they
and we would otherwise enjoy.
The objective of reducing the burden that immigrants impose on
natives through the public sector underlies restrictions on the access
93. The NRC, for example, found that the average immigrant with more than a high school
education pays enough in taxes to produce a net fiscal benefit. See NRC, supra note 68, at 334
(Table 7.5). In fact, once the NRC economists take the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant's
descendants into account, they find that the average immigrant with a high school education
produces a net surplus of $51,000, and the average immigrant with more than a high school
education produces a net surplus of $198,000. See id. (reporting net present value of average
fiscal impacts in 1996 dollars). Although these figures "do not take into account indirect fiscal
effects of immigrants arising from any consequences of immigration for the earnings or
employment of the existing labor force," the NRC notes that labor market effects on native
workers "are likely to be quite small and ... could even be positive." Id. at 305.
As long as the NRC calculations "contain no feedbacks through the general economy,"
however, "they do not reflect diminishing returns to immigrants as a result of their hypotheti-
cally increasing numbers." Id. at 333. An incremental immigrant might drive down the wages
of prior immigrants, for example, which would reduce the taxes paid by those prior immigrants.
Taking this effect into account, however, would not change our conclusion that skilled
immigrants confer a net economic benefit on natives. Any such reduction in taxes paid by
immigrants would be outweighed by the benefit natives enjoy in the labor market by reducing
the cost of immigrant labor. A wage reduction of one dollar, for example, would represent a
gain to natives as employers or consumers, and the resulting loss of tax revenues would offset
only a fraction of this gain. If a drop in wages of one dollar could reduce tax payments by more
than one dollar, then immigrants would enjoy a net benefit from wage reductions and would
have already demanded lower wages in order to enjoy this fiscal benefit.
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of aliens to various entitlement programs. Current U.S. laws, for
example, generally exclude nonimmigrants, including temporary
workers, and unauthorized immigrants from a broad range of public
benefits: with only narrow exceptions, these aliens are ineligible for
"any Federal public benefit."9 4 Current law also includes restrictions
on the access of other aliens, including even legal permanent resi-
dents, to federal entitlement programs. 95
The National Research Council ("NRC") estimates that by
excluding immigrants from various means-tested benefits for their
first five years in the United States, welfare legislation enacted in
1996 improves the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant by
$8,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars.96 Moreover, if the new
welfare law has the effects predicted by its proponents, then the
positive net fiscal impact of immigration will increase still more: the
new restrictions would not only reduce the transfers paid to individual
immigrants but also discourage the immigration of low-income aliens
and thereby raise the income of the average immigrant.97 Thus, the
NRC's estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration likely understate
the fiscal benefits of future immigrants, given the legislation passed
by Congress in 1996. Therefore, liberalized immigration is now even
more likely to produce net economic benefits for natives.
If immigration liberalization is coupled with expanded redistribu-
tion of income, however, then it may be necessary to exclude immi-
grants from these increased transfers. Otherwise, transfers to
immigrants could dissipate the economic gains to natives.98 Thus,
unskilled immigrants may have a net positive effect on the welfare of
natives only if we restrict their access to transfer programs.
2. Nonimmigrants and Access to Citizenship
Although immigrants can gain full access to public benefits upon
naturalization, only aliens "admitted for permanent residence" may
naturalize as U.S. citizens.99 Aliens admitted on nonimmigrant visas
only, including temporary workers, are not admitted as permanent
94. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a) (2000).
95. See id. §§ 1612-1613.
96. See NRC, supra note 68, at 339.
97. See 8 U.S.C. § 1601(2)(B) (2000) (stating the objective of ensuring that "the availability
of public benefits not constitute an incentive for immigration to the United States").
98. See Chang, supra note 67, at 1210.
99. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2000).
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residents and are thus not eligible for most public entitlements and
not eligible to naturalize.00 Therefore, even if fiscal concerns justify
restrictions on access to permanent residence for unskilled workers,
these concerns cannot justify restrictions on their access to nonimmi-
grant visas. A truly temporary worker, for example, would remain in
the United States only while employed and would then return home,
imposing even less of a burden on the public treasury than a perma-
nent resident.101 The empirical evidence indicates that immigrants are
likely to make a positive contribution to the public treasury through
the taxes they pay during their working years and impose a burden
only if they remain in the United States for their retirement years and
gain access to public benefits. 10 2 Thus, temporary workers admitted
on nonimmigrant visas, even if unskilled, are likely to have a net
positive economic impact on natives, and there is little reason to
restrict their entry.
Under current U.S. law, unskilled workers may enter temporarily
on H-2A visas for agricultural workers or on H-2B visas for other
workers, 103 but both visas are subject to labor certification require-
ments and other protectionist restrictions. 1°4 For example, H-2B visas
are limited to 66,000 per year, 05 and require workers to come "tem-
porarily to the United States to perform.., temporary service or
labor."'16 This "double requirement of 'temporariness' requires the
H-2B alien not only to enter temporarily but also to fill a temporary
job.107 The liberalization or elimination of these requirements could
greatly increase use of these programs. 08 As long as we retain the
requirement of employer sponsorship, we can ensure that these guest
100. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 12, at 99 (distinguishing immigrants from nonimmigrants).
101. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey
with an Analysis of U.S. Policy, in JUSTICE IN IMMIGRATION, supra note 41, at 158, 189.
102. See NRC, supra note 68, at 315 (Figure 7.9).
103. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii) (2000).
104. See id. § 1188(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(6)(iv) (2001).
105. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(g)(1)(B) (2000).
106. Id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b).
107. THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:
PROCESS AND POLICY 395 (4th ed. 1998).
108. Admissions under H-2B visas have remained below one-third of the quota limit in
recent years, and admissions under H-2A visas have been similar. See id. at 393; see also id. at
395 (noting that the demand for H-2B visas "would be much higher but for the double
'temporariness' requirement"); Sykes, supra note 101, at 189 (noting that "because of the
transaction costs of obtaining a visa coupled with the limited certifications for labor shortages in
the agricultural sector, employers often find that [H-2A] visas are not worth the effort to
procure").
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workers will be gainfully employed and likely to confer a net eco-
nomic benefit on natives. 109
The alternative to a liberalized guest-worker program for many
migrant workers is probably entry as an unauthorized immigrant. In
fact, employment-based immigration of unskilled workers into the
United States has largely taken the form of illegal rather than legal
immigration.110 Given that unauthorized immigrants have little access
to public entitlements for as long as their presence remains unauthor-
ized, they may make a positive contribution to public coffers under
the fiscal policies currently applied to them. Without distinguishing
between legal and illegal immigrants, the NRC found that once we
take the positive fiscal effect of the immigrant's descendants into
account, an immigrant with less than a high school education imposes
a net fiscal cost of only $13,000 in net present value in 1996 dollars."1
If the 1996 welfare legislation excludes immigrants from seven
specified means-tested benefits for only their first five years in the
United States, then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant
would improve by $8,000.112 These NRC figures suggest that if an
immigrant never has access to such benefits, as would be the case for
an unauthorized immigrant who never obtains legal status, then such
an immigrant would probably have a positive fiscal impact even if the
immigrant were unskilled.
If unauthorized immigrants produce benefits for natives through
not only the labor market but also the public sector, then natives have
little to gain by imposing sanctions on those who employ unauthor-
ized immigrants. The repeal of these sanctions would promote the
interests of both natives and unauthorized immigrants. Indeed, not
only has President Bush recently called for repeal,"3 but so has
organized labor, in a dramatic reversal of its support for employer
sanctions since lobbying for their enactment in 1986.114
Instead, legalization of unauthorized immigrants through a liber-
alized guest-worker program would serve the interests of these
109. See Chang, supra note 67, at 1181-83.
110. See id. at 1197.
111. See NRC, supra note 68, at 334.
112. See id. at 339.
113. See Bill Sammon, Bush Urges Legalizing Aliens, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2001, at Al.
114. See Nancy Cleeland, AFL-CIO Calls for Amnesty for Illegal U.S. Workers, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2000, at Al. Labor leaders cited the need to protect unauthorized immigrants from
exploitation by employers. See id.; Steven Greenhouse, Labor Urges Amnesty for Illegal
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2000, at A26.
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immigrants as well as the interests of natives. The workers would
gain from having a legal alternative to illegal entry and life as an
unauthorized immigrant, which leaves them vulnerable to deportation
by the government and abuse by employers. Furthermore, admission
as a guest worker need not entail permanent status as an alien. NRC
estimates indicate that the United States could allow even an un-
skilled immigrant to naturalize without generating a net fiscal burden
if a sufficient period of alienage without access to public benefits has
passed. In fact, as the Bush administration considers proposals to
liberalize our immigration policies, it is currently discussing an
expanded guest-worker program that would eventually allow aliens to
adjust their status to permanent residence and ultimately naturalize
as citizens."5
C. Intolerance
So how can we justify our current restrictions on the entry of
immigrant workers? It is difficult to see a principled justification for
imposing quotas or labor certification requirements upon their
immigration. These protectionist barriers do not serve the economic
interests of natives as a group.
Perhaps immigration barriers are a second-best response to the
concerns of natives when the first-best response is politically infeasi-
ble." 6 In this appeal to realism, as Goodin notes, "realism serves as
an excuse rather than as a justification," and "appealing to that
excuse imposes a further obligation, namely, to make very certain
that the constraints on doing better really are immutable." '117 If they
are not, then our duty is to seek to change those constraints so that
what was previously considered politically infeasible becomes possi-
ble. "Focusing too tightly on second- and third-best options makes us
not look closely enough to see whether and how the first-best option
might actually be pursued." '118
The question then becomes: why is the first-best policy less popu-
lar than the more costly policy of immigration restriction? Why are
115. See Marcus Stern, New Immigration Plan Raises New Issues: U.S.-Mexican Strategy
Goes Beyond Amnesty, Guest-Worker Program, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 12, 2001, at
Al.
116. Woodward makes this type of claim. See Woodward, supra note 40, at 80 ("Restric-
tions on entry, in my argument, have the status of non-ideal, second-best solutions ... in an
imperfect world.").
117. Goodin, supra note 59, at 249.
118. Id. at 256.
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we so quick to blame immigration for our problems and eager to seize
upon immigration restriction as the appropriate response? For
example, why do advocates for unskilled native workers lobby
successfully for immigration restrictions rather than for more redistri-
bution through the tax system? If opposition to redistribution makes
expanded transfers politically infeasible, then why is this opposition
any less vocal or any less effective against immigration restrictions
that achieve the same redistribution at higher cost? Immigration
restrictions, after all, do a worse job of serving the interests of natives
than more efficient transfer policies. 119
We can find at least part of the explanation for the popularity of
immigration restrictions in the preferences of natives regarding the
ethnic or racial composition of the U.S. population and thus its labor
force. Almost since their inception, federal immigration restrictions
have reflected concerns regarding the race and ethnicity of immi-
grants. 120 Soon after Congress began to regulate immigration in
1875,121 it enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act, I22 only the first in a
series of laws restricting the immigration of Chinese laborers.' 23
Subsequent laws reflected anxiety regarding not only Asian immigra-
tion but also immigration from eastern and southern Europe. In
1921, Congress enacted the first quantitative restrictions on immigra-
tion, creating a national origins quota system that skewed the alloca-
tion of visas toward aliens from northern and western Europe. 12 4
Given this history of racism and xenophobia, it would be naive to
assume that intolerance does not continue to provide political support
for immigration restrictions in general. Indeed, restrictionist authors
like Peter Brimelow are quite explicit in their expressions of alarm
regarding the racial complexion of the immigrant stream into the
United States.125 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the pervasive
influence of xenophobia in the formulation of our public policies in
119. See supra note 88.
120. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS
ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 7-12 (1980) (reviewing the history of discrimination in U.S. immigra-
tion policies).
121. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
122. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (repealed 1943).
123. See, e.g., Act of May 5, 1892, ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25; Act of Oct. 1, 1888, ch. 1064, 25 Stat.
504; Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115.
124. Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, § 2(a), 42 Stat. 5. Congress modified this system in the
Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 11(a), 43 Stat. 153, 159 (repealed 1965).
125. See PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER 58-73 (1995) (describing white America as caught between the
"pincers" of Hispanic and Asian immigration).
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Graham v. Richardson, when the Court declared that "classifications
based on alienage, like those based on... race, are inherently sus-
pect."12
6
Does this explanation for the popularity of immigration restric-
tions provide a justification? We might seek to interpret the "inter-
ests" of natives broadly to include the satisfaction of their preferences
regarding the ethnic or racial composition of the U.S. population. 27 It
is telling, however, that we normally reject intolerant preferences as
justifications for employment discrimination.128 A reliance on prefer-
ences for the ethnic status quo to justify our immigration laws would
underscore the second sense in which our immigration laws violate
our liberal antidiscrimination principles.
Restrictionists might respond that their preference is neither rac-
ist nor xenophobic, but simply a preference for associating with
workers most like themselves. Perhaps the restrictionist simply
prefers to be surrounded by workers who share the same culture and
the same values and fears becoming surrounded by those who seem
foreign and unfamiliar. But can we distinguish this associational
preference from intolerance-the desire not to encounter those who
are different? Would the desire of an employer or its employees to
maintain a white workplace, because they prefer its homogeneous
culture or simply value the familiar status quo, justify the exclusion of
racial minorities?
126. 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). The author of the Graham opinion would later explain that
"aliens often have been the victims of irrational discrimination" and "historically have been
disabled by the prejudice of the majority," which led "the Court to conclude that alienage
classifications 'in themselves supply a reason to infer antipathy'.. . and therefore demand close
judicial scrutiny." Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20-21 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting
Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979)). The Graham Court struck down state
laws conditioning access to welfare benefits on either U.S. citizenship or residence in the United
States for a specified number of years. Recognizing the tension between the Graham reasoning
and federal immigration restrictions, however, the Court would later refuse to apply the same
scrutiny to federal laws discriminating against aliens. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-87
(1976).
127. See Chang, supra note 67, at 1210-21. We might count the satisfaction of these racist or
xenophobic preferences an element of the welfare of these natives. If our objectives include the
regulation of the racial complexion of the labor force, then immigration restrictions serve that
objective well by excluding most people of color in the world from access to our labor market.
If the exclusion of foreigners is itself our objective, then a policy of exclusion yields a perfect fit
with that objective. From this perspective, immigration restriction would be a first-best policy,
not merely a second-best policy.
128. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 234-38 (arguing that a calculation of social welfare
should exclude intolerant preferences if it is to justify a public policy); Howard F. Chang, A
Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173,
179-96 (2000) (same).
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If we would reject such associational preferences as a reason to
exclude minorities from a single workplace, then why should we
accept them as a reason to exclude people from all the workplaces in
the entire country, where the claim of an impact on one's personal
associational interests seems far more remote and tenuous? Even if
we identify legitimate associational interests that do not derive from
intolerance, it seems difficult to explain why we must protect these
interests through employment discrimination mandated by the
government on a national scale rather than through the less restrictive
alternative of voluntary employment discrimination. If we consider
these associational preferences to be legitimate, then why not simply
allow employers to discriminate on the basis of national origin rather
than mandating such discrimination by law?
Indeed, our liberal ideals impose principles of neutrality on the
state that do not apply to the individual. Under this political theory, a
liberal state cannot justify discriminatory laws by endorsing one
particular conception of the good, for example, by favoring one
particular religion, whereas individuals are left free to pursue their
own conceptions of the good using their own private resources. 129
Thus, even if we consider individuals free to discriminate within some
private sphere based on ethnicity or cultural traits, these preferences
cannot provide a justification within our liberal framework for
discrimination imposed by the coercive powers of the state. 130
129. See ACKERMAN, supra note 38, at 11 (suggesting that in a liberal state, no one can
justify a legal regime by claiming that "his conception of the good is better than that asserted by
any of his fellow citizens"); RAWLS, supra note 18, at 448 (suggesting that in "a well-ordered
society,.., the plans of life of individuals are different in the sense that these plans give
prominence to different aims, and persons are left free to determine their good").
130. See Carens, supra note 22, at 268 ("When the state acts it must treat individuals
equally."). Ackerman suggests that the only legitimate reason for a liberal state to restrict
immigration is to protect the liberal state itself. See ACKERMAN, supra note 38, at 95 ("The
only reason for restricting immigration is to protect the ongoing process of liberal conversation
itself."). Similarly, Perry notes that the admission of "a large number of persons from groups
espousing illiberal or undemocratic principles ... might, if admitted on a sufficiently large scale,
pose a real risk to the existence or character of a liberal democracy." Perry, supra note 41, at
114. This observation, however, fails to justify the restrictions we currently impose on
immigration. See id. ("[I]t would presumably take a manyfold increase in the levels of
immigration to... the United States or Canada before such a risk could be regarded as anything
more than a theoretical possibility."). Furthermore, we reduce this risk if we admit aliens as
guest-workers with restricted access to citizenship rather than as permanent residents who will
ultimately naturalize and vote. Will Kymlicka, on the other hand, argues that "some limits on
immigration can be justified if we recognize that liberal states exist, not only to protect standard
rights and opportunities of individuals, but also to protect people's cultural membership." WILL
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 125 (1995). For insightful critiques of the cultural
argument for the exclusion of aliens, see JEAN HAMPTON, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 230-46
(1997); Perry, supra note 41, at 110-21.
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Instead, we are reluctant to satisfy these preferences explicitly
through regulation by the state. Indeed, in 1965 we abolished the
infamous national origins quota system because we recognized the
illegitimacy of preferences for particular ethnic groups."' How, then
can the preservation of the ethnic or cultural status quo be any more
acceptable as a reason for us to restrict immigration generally?
Unless we consider the ethnic purity of our labor force to be a public
good, it is hard to rationalize the employment discrimination man-
dated by our immigration restrictions as serving the national interest.
Thus, this employment discrimination against aliens, like the forms of
discrimination traditionally considered invidious, not only denies the
victims of discrimination equal concern but is also difficult to justify
as an ideal practice unless we appeal to illiberal preferences. To the
extent that these intolerant preferences help explain the enduring
popularity of immigration restrictions despite the costs of these
policies, this explanation underscores the illiberal nature of the
discrimination produced by these restrictions.
Intolerant preferences, however illegitimate, can impose real
constraints on the feasibility of liberalized immigration policies, just
as the general self-interest of natives may impose such constraints.
Nevertheless, we might plausibly view these preferences as more
amenable to reform than the tendency of natives to pursue their own
self-interest. The evolution of attitudes in the United States toward
ethnic groups once greeted with hostility offers hope that more
tolerant attitudes will eventually prevail with respect to those who
currently dominate the immigrant flow. Perhaps the process of
immigration itself will promote acceptance of these newer waves of
immigrants, much as integration ultimately brought more enlightened
attitudes regarding Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigration. Indeed,
spurred in part by the increasing political influence of the Hispanic
immigrant population in the United States, current discussions of
immigration reform have raised hopes for more open policies in the
near future, further underscoring the feasibility of liberalization.'32
131. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 120, at 11 ("The national origins
immigration quota system generated opposition from the time of its inception, condemned for
its attempts to maintain the existing racial composition of the United States.").
132. See Mark Benjamin, Parties in Competition for Hispanic Vote, UPI, July 24, 2001,
available at LEXIS, News Library, UPI File; Thomas B. Edsall, Amnesty Proposal Is Huge
Gamble for Bush; President Could be Rewarded With Hispanic Vote but Risks Angering GOP's
Conservative Wing, WASH. POST, July 17, 2001, at A2; Eric Schmitt, Open Door, Open
Questions; This Way Up, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2001, § 4, at 1.
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There may be other factors contributing to the popularity of im-
migration restrictions and standing in the way of reform. For exam-
ple, part of the problem may simply be the failure of the public to
understand the costs of protectionism, which imposes an implicit tax
on natives hidden as increases in the prices of goods and services.
This failure to appreciate the economic effects of misguided policies,
however, does not offer a justification for such policies. If these
popular misconceptions were immutable, it could also impose con-
straints on the feasibility of liberalized immigration policies, just as
the general self-interest of natives may restrict the set of politically
feasible immigration policies. It seems plausible, however, to assume
that these misconceptions are more amenable to change through
education than the constraints imposed by the self-interest of natives.
It is especially the role of scholars and educators not to take popular
myths as given but instead to seek to promote a more enlightened
understanding of the effects of public policies.
III. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY AND SECOND-BEST POLICIES
So what are we to make of the foregoing analysis? What are the
normative implications for immigration policy? Cosmopolitan liberal
ideals generally condemn discrimination against aliens. Even theories
that allow us to privilege the interests of natives over those of aliens
cannot justify employment discrimination against aliens as ideal
policy,'33 unless we count the satisfaction of illiberal preferences as a
reason to adopt immigration restrictions.
Excluding the satisfaction of segregationist preferences from our
notion of social welfare, the welfare of natives would at most justify
discrimination against unskilled alien workers in fiscal policies, such
as restricted access to public benefits, and in terms of access to
citizenship. There is little justification for employment discrimination
against aliens, given the alternative of redistribution among natives
through taxes and transfer programs. From the narrow perspective of
the economic interests of natives, temporary worker visas may be an
optimal response to fiscal concerns regarding alien access to public
benefits. Through guest-worker programs, natives enjoy the benefits
133. Thus, President Bush defends suggestions for immigration reform with a focus on a
liberalized labor market, stating: "[W]hen we find willing employer and willing employee, we
ought to match the two. We ought to make it easier for people who want to employ somebody,
who are looking for workers, to be able to hire people who want to work." Edwin Chen &
Jonathan Peterson, Bush Hints at Broader Amnesty, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2001, at Al.
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of unskilled alien workers in the labor market but do not bear the
fiscal burden of providing the full set of public benefits that these
workers would enjoy if they were to gain access to permanent resi-
dence and ultimately citizenship.
From the perspective of the interests of aliens, or from the per-
spective of cosmopolitan liberal principles of social justice, however,
these guest-worker programs are only second-best policies. From
these perspectives, the ideal policy may be legal permanent residence,
access to citizenship, and access to all public benefits. The
self-interest of natives, however, is bound to impose constraints of
political feasibility on the availability of immigrant visas. The empiri-
cal evidence suggests that unskilled alien workers are likely to have a
net negative fiscal impact if granted ready access to permanent
residence and ultimately citizenship. As long as natives are limited in
their willingness to bear these fiscal burdens, they are likely to restrict
alien access to permanent residence, either through quantitative
restrictions or through qualitative restrictions that establish demand-
ing criteria for eligibility. 131 These constraints are likely to exclude
many unskilled aliens from the U.S. labor market unless they either
are willing to immigrate illegally or have access to guest-worker visas.
134. See Ronald Brownstein, Residency at Core of Immigrant Debate; Policy: Dispute is
Likely to Focus on the Number of Undocumented Workers in U.S. Allowed to Seek Permanent
Status, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 2001, at Al. Conservative Republicans like Senator Phil Gramm
adamantly oppose any access to permanent residence for guest workers. Gramm has said that
any such program would have to pass "over my cold, dead political body." Michelle Mittelstadt,
Senators Call for Giving Residency to Immigrants; Bush Weighs Legalization Idea Pushed by
Fox, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 19, 2001, at 1A. Some observers have described guest-
worker programs as "more politically viable" without access to permanent residence. Jonathan
Peterson, Amnesty's the Road Bump in Debate on Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2001, at
Al. The Bush administration has shifted its energies toward a program for temporary workers,
which it regards as "more acceptable politically." Jonathan Peterson, Immigration Emphasis on
Guest Visas, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18,2001, at Al.
In a recent Gallup poll, 67% of respondents rejected easier access to U.S. citizenship
for unauthorized immigrants, while only 28% supported this proposal. See Steve Sailer,
Analysis: Why Bush Blundered on Immigrants. UPI, Sept. 10, 2001, available at LEXIS, News
Library, UPI File. Recognizing the political controversy generated by proposals to grant access
to citizenship, Mexico has also emphasized an expanded guest-worker program in its negotia-
tions with the Bush administration and has been careful not to press the issue of citizenship. By
maintaining flexibility on this issue, Mexico seeks, as the Mexican foreign minister Jorge
Castaneda puts it, "as many rights as possible, for as many Mexicans (in the United States) as
possible, as soon as possible" within the constraints of political feasibility. Robert Collier,
Momentum Grows to Legalize Migrants; Collapse of Compromise Deal on Bill Adds Pressure on
Bush, Congress, Mexico's Fox, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 2001, at Al. As one Mexican negotiator
explained, "we... have to be very realistic." Alfredo Corchado, Fox Pushes for a More Open
Border; Call for Freer Migration Stops Short of Request for Amnesty, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
July 16, 2001, at 1A. Castaneda has explained that access to citizenship "is not something of
huge significance to us." Sergio Munoz, Jorge Castaneda: Mexico's Man Abroad, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2001, at M3.
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Given such political constraints on access to permanent resi-
dence, guest-worker programs may represent the only alternative to
illegal immigration for aliens otherwise excluded from the U.S. labor
market.135 Thus, such programs promote the welfare of not only
natives but also aliens, compared to the politically feasible alterna-
tives; we should liberalize access to these programs by liberalizing or
eliminating labor certification requirements, quotas, and restrictions
on the duration of guest workers' employment or on their stays in the
United States. We should also remove restrictions on the types of
employment that these guest workers may take, so that aliens are free
to seek any job in the United States, and all sectors of the U.S.
economy can benefit from hiring them. Current discussions of an
expanded guest-worker program envision liberalization beyond the
agricultural sector, 36 which would represent at least a step in the right
direction.
The protection of the interests of natives does not require many
of the restrictions currently imposed on guest workers.'37 There is no
need, for example, to restrict the alien's freedom to move from one
employer to another or from one sector of the economy to another.
Like immigration restrictions, restrictions on mobility between jobs
are economically inefficient as well as unduly burdensome for the
worker subject to the restriction. Freedom to leave an employer and
to take employment elsewhere would give workers greater power to
assert their rights against employers and thus prevent abuses, without
destroying the gains from trade that natives enjoy from employing
alien workers. Thus, both Mexico and Democrats in Congress have
urged that a reformed guest-worker policy include the freedom to
change employers. 38 A proposal including at least this reform
appears likely to emerge from ongoing negotiations between the
United States and Mexico.139 We can also fortify the guest worker's
incentives to complain about abuses with protections against em-
135. See JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 302-03, 310
(1989) (arguing that a guest-worker program is better than a policy of exclusion); Chang, supra
note 67, at 1192-94 (same); see also Seidman, supra note 57, at 143 ("Why should anyone
believe that a guest worker is 'exploited' when he receives higher wages and more protection in
the program than he would receive if he remained in his home country?").
136. See Diane Lindquist, Guest-worker Plan Offers Jobs Beyond Farms, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Aug. 10, 2001, at A26.
137. Democrats in Congress have stressed that guest workers should enjoy the same rights
in the workplace as citizens. See Peterson, supra note 3, at Al.
138. See Corchado, supra note 2, at 1A; Thompson, supra note 3, at A2.
139. See Stern, supra note 115, at Al.
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ployer retaliation for whistleblowers, or even bounties or other
rewards for those who make meritorious claims that their employers
are violating the rights of employees. 140
At the same time, we must reduce or eliminate the protectionist
barriers that we currently impose on employer sponsorship, such as
labor certification. These liberalizing reforms are especially essential
if we make the employee's visa more portable. Employers will be
reluctant to invest much time or money in sponsoring a worker's visa
if the worker is then free to leave to work for a competing employer
who can thereby take a free ride on the sponsoring employer's
investment in the visa.
We might also allow unskilled guest workers to adjust their status
to permanent residence without imposing a net burden on natives if
appropriate conditions are met. Mexico has urged the United States
to allow guest workers to remain permanently, and a proposal includ-
ing some sort of access to permanent residence may yet emerge from
negotiations between the two countries.141 The conditions for adjust-
ment of status might include, for example, a sufficiently lengthy
period of residence and employment as a guest worker without a
criminal record, as well as payment of a sufficient amount in taxes
over this period. 1 2
In any event, a guest-worker program would not produce a he-
reditary class of alien residents in the United States because the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives U.S. citizen-
ship to anyone born in the United States, including the children of
nonimmigrants. 143 Thus, guest-worker programs in the United States
cannot create the type of caste society that they might in countries
that do not provide this birthright citizenship. Furthermore, citizen-
ship for the children of immigrants has proven to be consistent with
the national economic interest, as the available evidence indicates
140. The AFL-CIO has urged whistle-blower protections and amnesty for unauthorized
immigrants who complain about substandard working conditions or other violations. See
Cleeland, supra note 114, at Al; Frank Swoboda, Unions Reverse on Illegal Aliens; Policy Seeks
Amnesty, End to Sanctions, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2000, at Al.
141. See Stern, supra note 115, at Al.
142. See Laurie Goering, Bush Considering Green Card "Points" Mexicans Paying Taxes
Could Stay, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 2001, at 1; Eric Schmitt, No Agreement Yet with Mexico on
Immigration Plan, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2001, at Al.
143. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside.").
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that the descendants of even unskilled immigrants have a positive
fiscal impact, even taking into account the cost of public education.'"
Once we lift restrictions on the duration of a guest worker's resi-
dence and employment in the United States, however, the program
raises the prospect of de facto permanent residents with only re-
stricted access to citizenship. 14 Liberal objections to this prospect
help explain some of the political resistance to expansion of these
guest-worker programs. Woodward objects that "[t]he creation of a
class of permanent residents who are restricted from becoming
citizens (if they should wish to do so) or any similar system of differ-
ential status among a state's permanent inhabitants is fundamentally
incompatible with liberal egalitarian ideals.' 146 As Carens and others
have argued, however, the exclusion of aliens is also incompatible
with these ideals.14 If political realities require us to choose between
these two departures from our liberal egalitarian ideals, then how can
Woodward justify the choice that inflicts the greater harm on the
alien as well as on natives?
Ironically, Woodward himself notes that if we act against a
"background of non-ideal institutions and behaviour" in a world "in
which large numbers of people and institutions fail to do what justice
requires," we may "acquire obligations which are different from those
[we] would acquire under more perfectly just institutional arrange-
ments. ' 148 As Woodward states the theory of the second-best:
It is not in general a defensible moral principle that if it is obliga-
tory (or even a good thing) to do P under ideal, utopian circum-
stances, then it is also obligatory (or even a good thing) to do P
under the actual circumstances, no matter how far they may differ
from the ideal. 49
Goodin notes that "[t]here is much to be said for the realist argument
that insists upon "the importance of not making a fetish of moral
ideals," because "doing the best you can in an imperfect world may
well require you to compromise any (indeed, all) of your moral
144. See NRC, supra note 68, at 329 ("[T]he present value of the descendants of a current
immigrant.., is always positive, regardless of the immigrant's age at arrival and education
level.").
145. See Munoz, supra note 134, at M3.
146. Woodward, supra note 40, at 82.
147. See supra note 38.
148. Woodward, supra note 40, at 78.
149. Id. at 77; see Carens, supra note 15, at 45 ("Ideals do not always translate directly into
prescriptions for practice because of the second-best problems familiar from economic theory
which have their analogue in moral theory.").
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ideals" and a "[f]ailure to take due account of the probable reactions
of others can... have consequences that are truly catastrophic."' 150
Woodward advances realist claims in defense of immigration re-
strictions, but as we have seen, they could more plausibly justify
restrictions on alien access to public benefits and to citizenship.
Indeed, Woodward himself notes that "it is far from obvious that it
would be wrong ... to limit eligibility for social welfare programmes
to citizens or long-term residents, if failure to do so would jeopardize
the continued existence of such programmes."'' We might say the
same about restrictions on alien access to public benefits and citizen-
ship if these restrictions are necessary to make politically feasible the
alien's access to our labor market and the alien's admission in the first
place.
These second-best arguments require us to rank two non-ideal
alternatives, both of which fall short of our moral ideals. In this
regard, teleological moral theories have an advantage over deonto-
logical theories. Under a teleological theory, "those institutions and
acts are right which of the available alternatives produce the most
good."' 52 Once we specify the good, then a teleological theory can
provide a complete ranking of all alternatives, including non-ideal
alternatives.'53 Deontological theories, which do not maximize a good
specified in advance,'154 may not readily provide a ranking of non-ideal
alternatives.'55
We might, for example, specify the good as an appropriate meas-
ure of social welfare, one based on the satisfaction of preferences but
excluding those preferences that violate our liberal principles of
equality. Ronald Dworkin, for example, has proposed such a teleo-
logical theory. 56 If we apply this type of consequentialism and adopt
a cosmopolitan perspective, then a guest-worker program represents
the lesser of two evils when compared with the alternative of exclu-
sion. Exclusion not only decreases global wealth but also worsens its
150. Goodin, supra note 59, at 255.
151. Woodward, supra note 40, at 79.
152. RAWLS, supra note 18, at 24.
153. See ROBIN BOADWAY & NEIL BRUCE, WELFARE ECONOMICS 34 (1984) (defining a
"complete" ordering); JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 26 (3d ed. 1953) (same).
154. See RAWLS, supra note 18, at 30.
155. See id. at 303 (suggesting that "we may be able to find no satisfactory answer at all" in
"instances of nonideal theory").
156. See DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 234-38. I have outlined a similar theory, which I call
"liberal consequentialism." See Chang, supra note 128, at 195-96.
[Vol 78:291
IMMIGRA TION A ND THE WORKPLA CE
distribution, whereas a guest-worker program would improve social
welfare on both counts. From this perspective, liberal opposition to
guest-worker policies is harmful and misguided, because the alterna-
tive of exclusion raises even worse moral problems from the perspec-
tive of our liberal principles of equality.
Exclusion may benefit some workers in the country of immigra-
tion, but only at the expense of others in the country of immigration
and at the expense of alien workers who are even worse off than the
beneficiaries of the policy of exclusion. Thus, the employment
discrimination implied by a policy of exclusion is difficult to justify
from a cosmopolitan perspective because its primary victims are
poorer than the workers who are privileged by this discriminatory
regime. From this perspective, redistribution designed to compensate
the workers adversely affected by immigration may itself bring about
a desirable reduction in global inequality or may be necessary to
soften the political opposition to liberalized immigration, but this
redistribution is not strictly necessary for immigration liberalization
to be an improvement over the status quo. In terms of cosmopolitan
liberal ideals, the increase in global welfare and the improvement in
its distribution created by liberalization itself would be sufficient to
justify liberalization whether or not transfers compensate native
workers for the erosion of the privileged status conferred by restric-
tionist policies.
CONCLUSION
The employment discrimination against aliens implied by our
immigration restrictions is difficult to justify, whether we adopt the
cosmopolitan perspective or instead embrace less egalitarian liberal
ideals and favor the interests of natives over those of aliens. Consid-
erations of both global economic welfare and national economic
welfare militate in favor of liberalized alien access to our labor
markets. In the case of skilled aliens, the United States can lift
restrictions on the employment of aliens consistent with the national
interest by liberalizing access to employment-based immigrant visas
for skilled workers. In the case of unskilled aliens, however, the
optimal policy from the perspective of the interests of natives departs
significantly from the policy prescribed by cosmopolitan ideals.
While the employment discrimination implied by our immigration
restrictions remains difficult to justify, some discrimination against
unskilled aliens in the distribution of public benefits and in access to
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citizenship may serve the interests of natives. These considerations
militate in favor of guest-worker programs as policies that provide
access to our labor markets without necessarily providing full access
to the transfers provided to citizens.
While guest-worker programs may be ideal from the perspective
of the economic welfare of natives, they are only second-best policies
from the cosmopolitan perspective. The cosmopolitan liberal would
prefer that aliens have access to both our labor market and ready
access to public benefits and citizenship. As a matter of political
reality, however, natives are unlikely to admit aliens under those
generous conditions in the numbers that cosmopolitan ideals would
require, given the fiscal burden that those liberal policies would
entail. Given this constraint of political feasibility, cosmopolitan
liberals face a trade-off: significantly liberalized access to our labor
markets for unskilled alien workers will likely require some restric-
tions in access to public benefits and citizenship to have a realistic
chance of enactment. From a consequentialist perspective that
extends equal concern to aliens and natives, guest-worker programs
are less unjust than the status quo alternative of exclusion. Reforms
that reduce employment discrimination against aliens should prove
feasible, even while eliminating all discrimination against aliens
remains an unrealistic ideal. Therefore, I have suggested, cosmopoli-
tan liberals should support liberalizing reforms that include guest-
worker programs, even while seeking the broadest rights possible for
aliens within the constraints of political feasibility. While it would be
a mistake to pretend that this compromise is ideal from a liberal
egalitarian perspective, it would also be a mistake to sacrifice worth-
while reforms because they fall short of the ideal.
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